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What are the heterogeneous eects of nancial shocks on rms' behavior? This paper
evaluates and answers this question from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective.
Using micro data from Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis, starting in 2010, we
document that highly leveraged rms and rms that had a larger share of short-term
debt on their balance sheets contracted more in the aftermath of a nancial shock. We
use a standard model to analyze the conditions under which leverage and debt maturity
determine the sensitivity of rms' investment decisions to nancial shocks. We show that
the presence of long-term investment projects and frictions to the issuance of long-term
debt are needed for the model to rationalize the empirical ndings. We conclude that the
dierential responses of rms to a nancial shock do not provide unambiguous information
to identify these shocks. Rather, we argue that this information should be use to test for
the relevance of important model assumptions.
JEL: E44, F34, G12, H63
3 Real Eects of Financial Distress: The Role of Heterogeneity
1. Introduction
During an economic downturn, the dierential responses of nancially fragile
rms, when compared to their healthy counterparts, is a natural indication of
a nancial shock. An emerging strand of literature uses rms' leverage and
debt maturity structure as measures of nancial fragility, suggesting that these
are useful variables to identify nancial shocks.1 However, there is not a clear
consensus in the literature about the direction of the eects, e.g., are highly
leveraged rms more or less responsive to nancial shocks?2 Moreover, given
that leverage and debt maturity are ultimately endogenous variables, chosen at
least partially to accommodate potential nancial shocks, it is natural to ask
whether these dimensions of rm heterogeneity are good proxies of nancial
fragility. This paper evaluates and answers this question from both empirical
and theoretical perspectives.
On the empirical side, we use the Bank of Portugal's rich credit registry
database together with bank and rm balance sheet information around the
2010 sovereign debt crisis. We use Portugal as a laboratory to conduct this
analysis because it is a country that has arguably suered a large nancial
shock while the sovereign debt crisis was unfolding, in Europe.3 We measure
the nancial shock as the interaction between the sovereign crisis and the pre-
crisis sovereign debt holdings of the banks, from which individual rms borrow.
We then use the nancial shock to measure the dierential response of rms as
a function of their pre-crisis leverage and debt maturity structure. We nd that
highly leveraged rms and rms that had a larger share of short-term debt on
their balance sheets contracted more during the sovereign debt crisis.
1. Recent examples include Almeida et al. (2012), Benmelech et al. (2017), and Arellano
et al. (2017).
2. For instance, Ottonello and Winberry (2017) nd that low leverage rms respond more
to an interest shock, while Giroud and Mueller (2017) nd that highly leveraged rms
experienced a signicantly larger decline in employment, when faced with local consumer
demand shocks during the Great Recession.
3. The magnitude of the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal, as measured by the rise in the
sovereign risk premium, is second only to Greece, a country for which there is no data
available of similar quality.
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On the theoretical side, we analyze the conditions under which leverage
and debt maturity determine the sensitivity of rms' investment to nancial
shocks. In order to rationalize our empirical ndings, we require two essential
ingredients in the model. We show that the presence of long-term investment
projects and frictions to the issuance of long-term debt, as captured by an
individual specic term premium, are needed for the model to generate a
similar heterogeneous response of investment to the nancial shock, as in our
empirical analysis. Thus, we nd that the dierential responses of rms do
not provide unambiguous information to identify nancial shocks. Rather, we
argue that this information is useful to test for the relevance of important model
assumptions.
Our strategy to measure nancial shocks follows recent contributions using
credit registry, and rm and bank balance sheet information (Chodorow-Reich
2014; Acharya et al. 2014; Bottero et al. 2015). We assume that the severity
of the rm level shock is proportional to its lenders' exposure to the sovereign,
pre-crisis. The sovereign exposure of a bank is measured by the pre-crisis
Portuguese sovereign debt holdings, as a fraction of total assets on their balance
sheets. Intuitively, the net worth of banks with a large share of sovereign bonds
deteriorates more when the sovereign crisis occurs, as the market value of
sovereign bonds on their balance sheet declines sharply. To the extent that
the net worth of banks determines their supply of loans, the supply of credit
to individual rms borrowing from these banks also contracts.
We require two important additional conditions for our procedure to provide
a plausible measure of a nancial shock at the rm level. First, bank-rm
relationships should be persistent. Second, the pre-crisis matching between
rms and banks should not reect rm characteristics which themselves predict
the sensitivity of rms to a sovereign shock (beyond the eect passing through
the credit supply of their pre-crisis lenders). Regarding the rst condition,
we show that credit relationships are very persistent, both before and after
the sovereign debt crisis. With regard to the second condition, we show that
the pre-crisis characteristics of borrowers from banks with low and high pre-
crisis sovereign exposures are neither statistically nor economically signicantly
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dierent. In addition, in our empirical analysis we control for an array of pre-
crisis rm characteristics.4
Our empirical results are presented in two steps. We rst document eects
on the credit supply and then quantify the real eects in terms of some
crucial rm outcome variables. We nd that a bank in the 90th percentile of
sovereign holdings cuts lending to a highly leveraged rm by 3.5 percentage
points more than a bank in the 10th percentile.5 In terms of real eects,
our results are consistent in the sense that highly leveraged rms and those
that had a larger share of short term debt contracted signicantly more in
the immediate aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. Comparing rms with
a nancial shock in the 90th percentile with rms in the 10th percentile, a
rm with leverage in the top quartile contracts around 14 percentage points
more in terms of its total borrowing. Their xed assets, employment, and
usage of intermediate commodities fall by 7.2, 1.7, and 3.9 percentage points
more, respectively. By comparison, during this period, aggregate borrowing,
xed assets, and employment contracted by 13.8, 7.2, and 4.4 percentage
points, respectively. The eects along the debt maturity dimension are also
economically and statistically signicant, but relatively smaller. Our results
are robust to holdings of other distressed sovereign bonds, alternative time
spans, estimation methodologies, denitions of variables, and sectoral stress
exposures.
We perform an additional robustness analysis to conrm that leverage
and maturity structure of debt are indeed important determinants of rms'
performance. In addition to the sovereign channel, we explore the spillover
eects from non-performing to performing rms. The idea is that when some
rms start to default on their loans, the balance sheets of lenders deteriorate,
which has adverse consequences for other "performing" borrowers of the bank.
For this analysis we consider only about 70% of the total number of rms in
4. To further explore the possibility that rms unobservable characteristics drive our
results, following Khwaja and Mian (2008), we consider specications with rm xed eects,
which rely on information for rms that borrow from multiple banks.
5. We compare the rms in the top quartiles of the leverage and the maturity distributions
with their counterparts in the bottom three quartiles.
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the previous exercise, who had no overdue credit during the crisis episode. Our
results are qualitatively robust to those obtained in the sovereign channel, i.e.,
rms in the top quartile of leverage and the maturity distribution contracted
more, both economically and statistically, than the rms in the lower quartiles.
However, quantitatively speaking, the magnitudes are somewhat smaller.
We use a standard model of entrepreneurs facing a linear investment
opportunity subject to idiosyncratic investment risk and shocks to the interest
rate to interpret our empirical results. The key friction in the model is the
inability of entrepreneurs to insure against idiosyncratic shocks, a common
assumption in the recent macro-nance literature (Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014); Arellano et al. (2016)). The model is enriched to feature heterogeneous
cash ows from an initial long-term investment project and an initial debt
maturity choice. We analyze the conditions under which initial leverage and
debt maturity determine the sensitivity of rms' investment to the interest
shock, i.e., the nancial shock. We analyze the case in which the variation
in leverage and debt maturity is exogenous, and the more plausible case
in which the observed variation in leverage and debt maturity captures an
omitted variable that jointly determines investment and debt maturity. In the
second case, we interpret our empirical specication as capturing a reduced
form relationship between investment, the interest rate shock, leverage, and
debt maturity.
We rst consider the case in which the initial leverage and the debt maturity
are exogenous. In this case, we show that the sensitivity of rms' investment to
the interest shock is an increasing function of leverage, provided that the future
cash ows of the initial investment project, net of the payment of the long-term
debt, are positive. In contrast, the sensitivity of rms' investment to the interest
shock is an unambiguously decreasing function of maturity of the debt. We then
analyze the case in which debt maturity is endogenous. We consider situations
in which the variation in the maturity of debt reects heterogeneity across
entrepreneurs in the timing of the cash ows of the initial long-term investment
project and in the term premium faced by these entrepreneurs. We show that if
the variation in the maturity of debt reects heterogeneity across entrepreneurs
in the timing of the cash ows, then the sensitivity of rms' investment to the
interest shock are independent of leverage and debt maturity. Only when the
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variation in the maturity of debt reects heterogeneity in the term premium
does the model reproduce our empirical results.
We also analyze a model featuring diminishing returns and collateral
constraints, another set of common assumptions in the macro-nance literature
(Khan and Thomas (2013); Buera et al. (2015)). In this framework, the
investment of constrained entrepreneurs does not respond to an interest rate
shock, provided that the collateral constraint is not aected by the shock. In
contrast, the investment of unconstrained entrepreneurs is a decreasing function
of the interest rate. We also show that the relationship between initial leverage
and the future constrained state of an entrepreneur depends crucially on the
heterogeneity driving initial leverage. In the case that initial leverage is driven
by heterogeneity in their initial net worth, entrepreneurs with higher initial
leverage are more likely to be constrained and, therefore, the sensitivity of
entrepreneurs' investment to the interest rate shock is a decreasing function of
leverage. These results echo recent numerical ndings in Winberry and Ottonelo
(2017).6
Related Literature. Our work relates most closely to a recent empirical
literature using micro-data to identify and measure the eects of nancial
shocks and a theoretical macro-nance literature proposing alternative models
of the links between the nancial and real sectors.
Our strategy to measure nancial shocks follows recent contributions using
credit registry, and rm and bank balance sheet information. Regarding the
recent 2008-09 nancial crisis in the US, Chodorow-Reich (2014) uses the
DealScan database and employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics Longitudinal Database to show that rms that had pre-crisis
relationships with banks that struggled during the crisis reduced employment
more than rms that had relationships with healthier lenders. In particular,
it uses the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 as the event
around which the analysis is constructed. Similarly, Bentolila et al. (2017)
match employment data from the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System and
loan information obtained from the Bank of Spain's Central Credit Register
6. The opposite result is obtained when the variation in initial leverage is driven by
heterogeneity in their initial productivity of an entrepreneur.
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to document that during the recent nancial crisis Spanish rms that had
relationships with banks that obtained government assistance recorded a higher
job elimination rate than rms with relationships with healthy banks.
Iyer et al. (2014) study the credit supply eects of the unexpected freeze
of the European interbank market in August 2007, using Portuguese credit
registry and bank balance sheet data. They nd that the credit supply
reduction is more pronounced for rms that are smaller, with weaker banking
relationships. Cingano et al. (2016) use the Bank of Italy's credit register to also
provide evidence that rms that borrowed from banks with a higher exposure to
the interbank market experienced a larger drop in investment and employment
levels in the aftermath of the 2007 nancial crisis. They nd stronger eects
among small and young rms and those with a high dependence on bank credit.
Closer to our focus on the European sovereign debt crisis, Bofondi et al.
(2017) look at the aggregate credit supply eects of the sovereign debt crisis
using data from the Italian credit register. Bottero et al. (2015) also use data
from the Italian Credit Register to show that the exogenous shock to sovereign
securities held by nancial intermediaries, which was triggered by the Greek
bailout (2010), was passed on to rms through a contraction of credit supply.
Finally, Acharya et al. (2014) explore the impact of the European sovereign
debt crisis and the resulting credit crunch on the corporate policies of rms
using data from Amadeus, SNL, Bankscope, and other sources, however they
look only at the syndicated loan market.
Our analysis of the dierential impact of nancial crisis along the rm
leverage and debt maturity dimensions speaks to a recent literature that relies
on (some of) these variables to identify nancial shocks. Almeida et al. (2012)
use long-term debt maturity [...] as an identication tool to measure the causal
eect of the 2007 nancial crisis on investment. They document that during
the 2007 global nancial crisis, US rms whose long-term debt was largely
maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 cut their investment-to-capital
ratio by 2.5 percentage points more (on a quarterly basis) than otherwise similar
rms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008. Benmelech et al. (2017)
also use preexisting variation in the value of long-term debt that came due
during a crisis episode to identify a nancial shock. Using historic US data from
the Great Depression, they nd that rms more burdened by maturing debts
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cut their employment levels more. They also show than more leveraged rms
contracted employment by more. Related, Giroud and Mueller (2017) show that
establishments of more highly leveraged rms experienced signicantly larger
employment losses in response to declines in local consumer demand.
In a more structural setting, Arellano et al. (2017) use the heterogeneous
response of rms to calibrate by how much a rise in sovereign premium aects a
rms' interest rate. They argue that the implications of these higher borrowing
rates are not homogeneous in the population of rms, because they are more
damaging to the performance of rms with large borrowing needs, i.e., more
leverage in their model and empirical analysis.
We contribute to this literature by testing whether investment of leveraged
rms and/or rms with short-term debt maturity are more responsive to an
identied nancial shock. In addition, we analyze in relative standard models
the conditions under which leverage and debt maturity determine the sensitivity
of rms' investment to nancial shocks.
In analyzing the conditions under which leverage and debt maturity
determine the sensitivity of rms' investment to nancial shocks, our work
sheds light on the model elements that are important to capture the eects
of nancial shocks. The macro-nance literature has used alternative models
of nancial frictions and specications of the investment technologies. For
instance, the inability of entrepreneurs to insure against idiosyncratic shocks
is a common assumption in the recent macro-nance literature, e.g., Angeletos
(2007); Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014); Arellano et al. (2016). Collateral
constraints are another popular device to introduce nancial frictions into
macro models, e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997). While constant returns is a convenient modeling choice, diminishing
returns have been featured in quantitative oriented analysis of nancial shocks,
e.g., Khan and Thomas (2013), Buera et al. (2015) among others.
In our benchmark analysis we use a standard model of entrepreneurs facing
a linear investment opportunity subject to uninsured idiosyncratic investment
risk and shocks to the interest rate to interpret our empirical results. Relative to
the literature, the model is enriched to feature heterogeneous cash ows from
an initial long term investment project and an initial debt maturity choice.
We show that the presence of long-term investment projects and frictions to
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the issuance of long-term debt, as captured by an individual specic term
premium, are needed for the model to generate a similar heterogeneous response
of investment to the nancial shock, as in our empirical analysis. We also
analyze a model featuring diminishing returns and collateral constraints. In
this framework we show that the sensitivity of investment to a nancial shocks
is a decreasing function of leverage, provided that the heterogeneity in leverage
is driven by dierences in the initial net worth of entrepreneurs. Therefore,
our theoretical analysis shows that the heterogeneous response of investment
along the leverage and debt maturity dimensions provides a useful test of
alternative model elements rather than unambiguous information to identify
nancial shocks.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the macroeconomic
events in the lead up to the sovereign debt crisis. Section 3 provides our main
empirical analysis. We start by describing the data and lay special emphasis
on documenting the absence of adverse rm-bank matching in the data. Next
we proceed to the lending and real eects regressions for the sovereign channel.
Section 4 provides a discussion of the robustness exercises that were carried
out including a detailed description of the spillover channel. Section 5 presents
our theoretical model, and Section 6 concludes. All gures, tables, and proofs
of the propositions are in the appendix.
2. An overview of the macroeconomic events
Until late 2009 or early 2010 the viability of sovereign debt was not a concern for
the markets. For over a decade the yields of bonds issued by European countries
had been low and stable. However, in the spring of 2010, when the Greek
government requested an EU/IMF bailout package to cover its nancial needs
for the remaining part of the year, markets started to doubt the sustainability
of sovereign debt. Soon after Standard & Poors downgraded Greece's sovereign
debt rating to BB+ ("junk bond") leading investors to be concerned about the
solvency and liquidity of the public debt issued by other peripheral Eurozone
countries like Ireland and Portugal.
In May 2010, following the Greek bailout request, the CDS spreads on
Portuguese sovereign bonds increased dramatically (Figure 1, top left panel)
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and suddenly the Portuguese banks lost access to international debt markets
(Figure 1, top right panel). They could not obtain funding in medium and long-
term wholesale debt markets and this had been an important source of their
funding until then (around 19% of their total liabilities). This sudden stop is
attributed mainly to investor's concerns about contagion from the sovereign
crisis in Greece. The sudden rise in Portuguese CDS spreads meant that the
banks that were more exposed to the public sector saw the risk in their balance
sheets going up. Fears about the solvency of the sovereign can put the solvency
of banks at risk, since banks typically hold a substantial portion of their assets
in the form of sovereign debt (Brunnermeier et al. (2011)).
The top-left panel of Figure 1 plots the sovereign credit default swap spreads
for Portugal and the average of Italy, Ireland, and Spain. We also plot Germany
as a benchmark. The vertical line marks May 2010. In the top right panel of
Figure 1, we plot the funding obtained through securities (market funding).
The two events combined, i.e. the sudden fall in the value of assets and the
rise in funding costs, led to a pass-through into the lending rates paid by rms.
Specically, we observe a rise in the short-term interest rates. The bottom left
panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of the spread between the average lending
rates by banks at one year maturity relative to the return of a 1-year German
sovereign bond. The two panels on the left lend credence to the fact that the
sovereign and lending rates are extremely closely related. We call this channel
of transmission of shock as the sovereign channel.
Another stylized fact that we observe in the data is the rapid accumulation
of non-performing loans on the banks' balance sheets. In the bottom right panel
of Figure 1, we present the non-performing loans as a fraction of total loans
of banks in Portugal.7 This motivates us to think of other potential channels
of transmission of nancial distress onto the real sector. To elaborate further,
we are interested in studying if a rm, conditional on not having any loans in
default (overdue>90 days) in 2009 or 2010, was aected adversely because its
lenders were accumulating non-performing assets on their balance sheets. This
is what we call the spillover channel.
7. Our analysis will be strictly cross-sectional, however, and we do not provide explanations
for the spike in NPLs over time.
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Figure 1: Evolution of sovereign CDS spreads, market funding to Portuguese banks,
bank lending spreads to Portuguese non-nancial corporations, and the share of non-
performing loans to Portuguese rms during the sovereign european crisis.
To sum up, the aggregate economic environment in Portugal during this
period was adverse.8 The banks were hit particularly hard as they were the
center of the capital ows and in 2010 accounted for approximately half of the
net foreign debt of Portugal (Chen et al. (2012)). Arguably the trigger for these
events was the bailout request by Greece in April 2010. This bailout request
prompted a complete reassessment of the default risk of a number of countries
8. For a further detailed description we refer the reader to Reis (2013), who documents the
events as they occurred in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece. The yields
on 10 year Portuguese bonds rose from 3.9% to 6.5% during 2010. Public spending also rose
markedly, partly because of the automatic stabilizers, and partly because the government
implemented a campaign promise of raising public sector wages after years of zero increases.
The sudden stop in capital inows aected, especially, the non-tradable sector and brought
about a sharp decline in output, a phenomenon that has also been observed in many Latin
American countries.
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of the European Economic and Monetary Union (especially the peripheral
European countries) and can be considered as the rst, unprecedented, and
unanticipated episode that challenged the notion of risk less sovereign debt in
the Euro area since the adoption of the Euro.
3. The empirical analysis
3.1. Our data
For this analysis we build a comprehensive and unique dataset for the
Portuguese economy. We use three separate datasets, which can be merged
using the rm and bank identication codes. The datasets used were the
Central Credit Register (CRC), the Central Balance Sheet Database (CBSD),
and the Monetary and Financial Statistics. The CRC is managed by Bank of
Portugal and contains information reported by the participants (the institutions
that extend credit) concerning credit granted to individuals and non-nancial
corporations and the situation of all such credit extended. Any loan amounting
to 50 euros or more is recorded in the credit register. For this analysis, we
consider only credit extended to non-nancial corporations and exclude the
household sector. Further, we will consider only the total committed credit
between the rm and a bank.9 The CBSD is based on accounting data of
individual rms. Since 2006, annual CBSD data has improved considerably
and has been based on mandatory nancial statements reported in fulllment
of rms' statutory obligations under the Informação Empresarial Simplicada
(Simplied Corporate Information, Portuguese acronym: IES). The MFS data
provide us with information on the bank balance sheet components. Variables
such as banks' sovereign exposures, size, capital ratios, and liquidity ratios are
obtained from this database. The CRC and the CBSD can be merged using the
rm identier. Then, using the bank identier, we merge it with the MFS to
obtain our comprehensive dataset.
9. We ignore items such as renegotiated or written o credit that also appears in the
database owing to data quality issues.
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In Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 we provide an overview of the dataset
constructed. Table A.1 reports aggregate statistics on rms while Tables A.2
and A.3 report bank level characteristics. The rst column of Table A.1
represents all rms from the CBSD, i.e. all rms that le taxes in Portugal.
The second column includes rms that have obtained credit from a nancial
institution and the last column shows only rms that have multiple banking
relationships. To further improve the quality of the analysis, we drop the micro
rms i.e. we consider only rms who had an outstanding loan amount equal to
or greater than 10,000 euros as of the last quarter of 2009. All gures reported
are for 2009:Q4. The lower panel of Table A.1 elaborates the data presented
in the top right panel. We present rm characteristics based on leverage and
debt maturity heterogeneity, since these are the two dimensions we study in
this paper. A highly leveraged rm is one that has more than 47% leverage
while a high ST debt rm is one that has more than 53% short-term debt,
where both these numbers correspond to the 75th percentiles of the respective
distributions. Our nal sample of rms is quite representative of the Portuguese
economy overall. To provide some insight, the sample represents 71% of total
loans granted as of December 2009. It further represents 70.51% of aggregate
employment in Portugal, 76.41% by turnover, and 77.07% by assets. Further,
we check if the labor share of each sector in the population closely matches
the labor share of each sector in the sample. The correlation coecient stands
at 0.98, with the three largest sectors by employment being manufacturing,
wholesale/retail services, and construction.
3.2. Firm-Bank matching prior to the sovereign debt crisis
Before proceeding any further in our empirical investigation, it is imperative to
verify that rms were not matched (ex ante) to banks in an adverse, observable
manner. In other words, were (ex post) weak banks lending to weak rms
prior to the crisis? To see that this is not the case, we need to document that
the banks that were dierently exposed to the sovereign (ex ante) were not
operating dierent business models, did not have dierent funding structures,
or most importantly, did not have dierent types of client proles. In Table
A.2 we provide bank characteristics, while Table A.3 documents borrower
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characteristics. We also report a simple `t' test of means and to test the null
hypothesis that the mean of these variables is equal across the two groups. Table
A.2 reports data from the nancial institutions operating in Portugal. We group
the individual nancial institutions into 33 banking groups and work at this
level of consolidation. For condentiality reasons we are not able to provide
further information on the identity of rms or banks used in this analysis, but
a few broad characteristics can be seen from the table. Lending to the non-
nancial corporations is a central part of the business of banks in Portugal.
The banks that were more exposed to the sovereign before the crisis, tended
to have higher liquidity ratios and lower exposures to the household sector. In
terms of the corporate exposure, the two groups are very comparable. We also
compare the funding structures of the banks, namely security funding, inter-
bank market borrowing, and central bank funding. As we can observe, there
is no great dierence between the two groups and none of the dierences are
statistically signicant, as shown in the last column.
Table A.3 reports weighted borrower characteristics of high and low
sovereign banks. We document borrower age, size, short-term debt share,
leverage, protability, and non-performing loans ratio, as of 2009:Q4. Once
again, we nd no signicant dierences between the two groups. Besides the
tables, Figure B.5 in the appendix plots banks' sovereign exposures vs. non-
performing loan shares for four quarters prior to the shock in April 2010. These
correlations turn out to be negative and insignicant, further conrming the
fact that the banks that were holding more public debt did not necessarily have
more risky balance sheets, ex ante. To allay further concerns, we will augment
our regression specications with appropriate xed eects, to be discussed in
the next section.
3.3. Regression specications
For the empirical analysis, all growth rates were constructed following Davis






where gEt is the growth rate of variable ‘E
′ at time ‘t′ and xt is the mean of
the variable over the current and the last period i.e.,
xt = 0.5 ∗ (Et +Et−1).
This measure of net growth is bounded between +2 and -2 and symmetric
around zero. A value of +2 corresponds to entrants while a value of -2
corresponds to rms that exit the market. This method of computing the
growth rates helps us account for both the intensive and extensive margins
and also helps us minimize the eects of outliers. This method of computing
the growth rate is monotonically related to the conventional measure and the
two are equal for small growth rates in absolute value. It can be shown that
if GEt is the conventional growth rate measure i.e. the change in a variable
normalized by the lagged value of that variable, then GEt = 2g
E
t /(2− gEt ).
We now proceed in two steps. We rst document the eects on credit supply
during the crisis. Second, we document the real eects of the sovereign debt
crisis. For this analysis we construct a weighted sovereign exposure measure for
each rm. To elaborate, we note all the bank-rm relationships in the fourth
quarter of 2009 and the banks' respective sovereign holdings as a fraction
of their total assets. Using the relative shares of each bank in a rm's loan
portfolio, we can construct our sovereign exposure measure for each rm. For
the rest of the analysis we keep the shares, and therefore, exposures constant.
In other words, a rm's exposure to the sovereign through its lenders is
predetermined in our model. To be precise, our rm level weighted sovereign




si,b ∗ sovereign shareb, (1)
where si,b is the share of bank `b' in the total borrowing of rm `i' and
sovereign shareb is the total Portuguese sovereign bond holdings of bank `b'
normalized by total assets. Figure B.1 presents the distribution of the weighted
sovereign exposures of the rms in the fourth quarter of 2009. The important
implicit assumption is that the banks transmit shocks to the real sector,
proportional to their pre-crisis lending relationships. To verify the validity
of this assumption, we document the fact that rm-bank relationships are
17 Real Eects of Financial Distress: The Role of Heterogeneity
extremely persistent in Portugal. The probability of a rm-bank relationship
continuing in the next period, conditional on it existing in the current period,
is around 0.87. The probability that a bank remains a rms' lead lender in the
next period, conditional on it being the lead lender in the current period, is 0.80.
Furthermore, the persistence of past relationships did not decline, and actually
increased slightly, during the sovereign crisis. Table C.1 in the appendix reports
these results.
The real variables we use in our analysis are employment, xed assets, rm
liabilities/total debt, and the usage of intermediate commodities. To construct
the growth rates, we use stocks in the fourth quarter of 2009 and 2010. Other
robustness measures such as taking two-year averages on either side of the
sovereign shock were also conducted, and the results were consistent with those
reported here.
To document the eects on lending on the intensive margin we take recourse
to the methodology developed in Khwaja and Mian (2008). In our sample,
around sixty percent of the rms have multiple banking relationships and we
exploit this fact to identify if there were any adverse eects on lending, on the
intensive margin. The baseline regression model we estimate is the following:
%∆Li,b,Q4:10−Q4:09 = α0 +α1sovereign shareb,Q4:09 +Bb,Q4:09 +αi + εi,b, (2)
where %∆Li,b,Q4:10−Q4:09 is the growth rate of total committed credit between
a rm-bank pair i, b between Q4:09 and Q4:10, sovereign shareb,Q4:09 is the
sovereign share of bank `b' in Q4:09 and αi is a vector of rm xed eects that
help us control for demand side factors. We later augment the above equation to
include interaction terms with high leverage and high short-term debt dummies
to identify such heterogeneities in the data.
The results are presented in Table A.4. Columns 1 - 5 report regression
results for rms having multiple banking relationships and columns 6 and 7
include rms having single relationships as well, for the sake of completeness.
Column 1 presents the baseline case without interactions and we observe no
statistically signicant average eect of bank sovereign exposures on lending.
However, when we include interaction terms with a high leverage dummy
and a dummy that captures high short-term debt share, we obtain quite
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dierent results. We nd that there was an overall statistically signicant
reduction of lending to rms that were highly leveraged and those that had
a signicant share of short-term debt on their balance sheets. In terms of
economic magnitudes, these eects are quite substantial as well. For the highly
leveraged rms (columns 2 and 3), the bank with a sovereign exposure in the
90th percentile reduces lending by 3.5 percentage points more than a bank in
the 10th percentile, to the same rm. The same gure stands at 4.7 for rms
that had a high share of short-term debt on their balance sheets (columns 4
and 5). To put these magnitudes into perspective, aggregate bank lending to
the non-nancial sector grew, although sluggishly, at 0.04 percent during the
same time period.
Besides interacting the bank sovereign exposures with a dummy
corresponding to the top quartile of leverage and short-term debt, we also do so
with dummy variables for rms in all four quartiles to study the credit supply
eects on rms belonging to each of these quartiles. Figure (4) illustrates the
results. We observe how the credit contraction is much more pronounced for
rms in the top-most quartile of leverage and short-term debt, when compared
to rms in the lower quartiles. Firms in the bottom two quartiles (in terms
of both leverage and debt maturity) do not appear to have experienced a
signicant decline in credit (either economically or statistically) but the results
are quite the contrary for rms in the higher quartiles.
We now turn to analyzing the eects on the real variables. The baseline
regression we estimate is the following:








2 + εi, (3)
where the variable `V' represents employment, xed assets, rm liabilities, and
intermediate commodities and sovi,Q4:09 represents weighted rm sovereign
holdings in the fourth quarter of 2009. Fi is a vector of rm specic controls and
we include measures of protability, age, size, leverage, and maturity structure
of debt. Bb is a vector of weighted bank controls and the variables we use here
are the bank size, average interest rate on loans, capital ratio, and the liquidity
ratio. We also include industry and location xed eects in our regressions,
following our discussion of rm-bank matching in subsection 3.2.
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The results are reported in Table A.5. On average we do not nd statistically
signicant eects of the shock after controlling for bank and rm specic
characteristics. However, we are interested in exploring potentially interesting
dimensions of heterogeneity. In particular, we explore whether rm leverage and
the maturity structure of debt are important nancial variables that determine
rm performance. Bearing this idea in mind, we estimate regressions that
address more specic questions. The rst question we ask is, are the rms
that are highly leveraged more adversely aected than their lower leveraged
counterparts? To answer this question, we modify equation (2) as follows:







2 + εi, (4)
Here we include a dummy for rms having pre-crisis leverage of greater
than 47%, which corresponds to the 75th percentile of the leverage distribution
in 2009, and also the interaction of the dummy with the sovereign exposure
measure. The leverage here is dened as all interest bearing liabilities
normalized by total assets. We performed robustness analysis by considering
pure bank leverage, and our results were robust to this alternative measure.
The results are reported in Table A.6. The coecient on the sovereign share
variable captures the impact for the low leveraged rms where we do not nd a
statistically signicant eect, as reported in the second row from the bottom.
The total real eect of the crisis on the highly leveraged rms can be obtained
by taking the sum of the coecients on the sovereign exposure term and the
interaction term. For the sub-category of the highly leveraged rms, we nd
signicant negative eects of the crisis. The employment, capital, total debt,
and intermediate commodities all show a sizable decline. In other words, rms
that were highly leveraged prior to the onset of the sovereign debt crisis appear
to contract more than the ones that were less leveraged (better capitalized).
The economic magnitudes are also quite signicant. For the highly leveraged
rms, moving from the 10th percentile of the distribution of weighted sovereign
exposures to the 90th percentile, we observe a decline of 1.7% in terms of
employment, relative to their low leveraged counterparts. During the same
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period the aggregate employment for all rms in our sample contracted by
4.4%. Similarly, the contraction in terms of assets, total debt, and intermediate
commodities were 7.2%, 13.8%, and 3.9% respectively. For all the rms in our
sample, in the same time period, the assets contracted by 1.3%, total debt
contracted by 14%, and the usage of intermediate commodities was reduced by
around 1%.
It might also be interesting to study the eects along the distribution of
leverage. Figure (5) reports the impact on our rm outcome variables. This
is done separately by grouping rms into four leverage bins (by quartiles), as
shown in panel (a). In the regression analysis presented earlier, we compared
the top quartile with the bottom three quartiles. This analysis breaks it down
further to shed light on how rms in each of these quartiles perform in the
immediate aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis and to uncover potential
non-linearities in the data. We observe that as we move from the lowest to
the highest quartile of leverage the rms were more adversely aected. In
other words, the eects are much more subdued for rms with lowest leverage
when compared to the their counterparts that have signicantly more leveraged
balance sheets.
The next potentially interesting dimension of rm heterogeneity that we
study is the maturity structure of debt. The following regression that we
estimate seeks to answer the question if rms that had a signicant share of
short-term debt on their balance sheets were more adversely aected by the
sovereign debt crisis. The standard intuition is that the rms that have a longer
maturity structure will not need to renance during the height of the crisis,
and therefore would be relatively hedged. In the theory section we rene this
intuition using a model that endogenizes the maturity structure. We conduct
this analysis by using a dummy (hstdebt) that is set equal to 1 for rms having
a pre-crisis share of short term-debt greater than 53%, which corresponds to
the 75th percentile of the maturity distribution in 2009.







2 + εi, (5)
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The results are presented in Table A.7. As in the previous case, we nd
statistically signicant negative eects on the rms that have a larger share of
short-term debt on their balance sheets. These results are robust across all of
our real variables. Once again, these magnitudes are economically signicant
as well. For a rm with a higher share of short-term debt, moving from the
10th to the 90th percentile of weighted sovereign exposures brings about a fall
of 1.2% in terms of employment, 2.3% in terms of assets, 2.5% in terms of total
debt, and 1.9% in terms of intermediate commodity usage.
In Tables A.5 and A.6, we also report p values from the one sided t-test for
the sum of the two coecients of interest to be less than zero and we fail to
reject the null hypotheses in all the cases considered. This is done to document
the fact that the overall eect on the highly leveraged rms and the rms with
a higher share of short-term debt was indeed negative. A quick point must be
made here regarding the rationale for including the total debt as one of our
real variables. By means of estimating equation (2), we have documented that
fragile rms experienced a decline in credit supply in the immediate aftermath
of the sovereign debt crisis. A natural question that arises is whether they were
able to substitute the loss in funding by moving to other less exposed banks
or by taking recourse to other forms of funding such as trade credit. This was
indeed not the case. If it were, we would not observe a decline in total debt,
which is a comprehensive measure of all rm liabilities. Therefore, our total
debt measure helps us document the fact that these fragile rms were not able
to instantaneously seek funding elsewhere.
Similar to the case of leverage, we also analyze the eects along the
distribution of short-term debt. Panel (b) of Figure (5) reports the results.
As in the previous case, this analysis sheds light on how rms in each of the
four quartiles perform and also documents interesting non-linearities in the
data. Overall our results are in line with the case of leverage. Firms in the
lowest quartile of short-term debt present results with much smaller economic
magnitudes than rms in higher quartiles.
We have thus far documented that the overall level of debt and the maturity
structure of debt were each individually detrimental for real activity in the
aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. However, one may wish to see if either
of the two variables dominate or if they are they equally important. To address
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this issue, we include both the interaction terms in our baseline regression, and
the results are presented in Table A.8. We nd persistently signicant negative
eects on the rms that were highly leveraged and those that had a signicant
share of short-term debt. This makes us infer that both variables are equally
important while analyzing the real eects of the crisis in Portugal.
4. Robustness/Discussion
In this section we discuss our results further and explain the robustness
exercises conducted to ensure the stability of our results and validity of our
conclusions. We start by exploring the spillover channel to ensure that leverage
and debt maturity are indeed important determinants of rms' performance for
an alternative measure of the nancial shock, and then proceed to the other
several robustness checks that were conducted.
4.1. The spillover channel
In the last section, we documented the real eects of nancial distress
originating from the banks' holdings of (ex ante risk-free) sovereign bonds.
In this sub-section we explore another novel channel of transmission of shocks
from the nancial to the real sector. The only dierence is that now we look
at the real eects on rms that did not have any non-performing loan in our
sample period. The question we ask is whether or not the rms, all of whose
loans were and remained in good standing, were aected in any way by the
aggregate shock to the economy. And, do leverage and debt maturity structure
continue to be important dimensions of heterogeneity for this sub-group of
performing" rms as well. We perform the analysis in three steps.
1. We start by calculating the non-performing loans (NPL) of the rms, in
Q4:09 and Q4:10, as a fraction of total outstanding loans. We dene a
dummy that takes a value of 1 if the rm has an NPL share greater than
0. We then regress the NPL dummy in 2010 on the NPL dummy in 2009
and rm level controls in 2009. The predicted value from this regression
is the probability that a particular rm will have positive non-performing
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loans in 2010 conditional on it having some non-performing loans in 2009.
We run the following regression and obtain the predicted values:
NPLi,Q4:10 = NPLi,Q4:09 +Xi,Q4:09 + νi, (6)
where Xi,Q4:09 is a vector of rm level controls prior to the crisis. It
includes the variables like age, size, leverage, maturity structure of debt,
and location and sector xed eects. The results are reported in Table C.2
in the appendix. The probability of having a non-performing loan in 2010
conditional on having some in 2009 was estimated to be in the interval
0.66-0.79, depending on the specication. We report results with the most
optimistic estimate of 0.66 but we re-estimated all our regressions with the
probability being 0.79 to ensure robustness of our analysis.10
2. In this step we construct a proxy for risk on banks' balance sheets. To
this end we use the predicted values from the last regression (N̂PLi,Q4:10).
Our measure of ex ante bank risk is computed in a manner similar to our
computation of weighted sovereign exposures. We now weight the borrowers





where, si,b is the share of bank b's loans going to rm `i' in Q4:09. To
analyze the spillover eects, however, we need to look at rms that had all
their loans in good standing in both of the time periods under analysis. We
perform this selection in step 3 below.
3. We take recourse to the central credit registry database once again. We
have information on the status of all loans obtained by a rm. In the
event that a loan is overdue, we have information on how long the loan
has been overdue. We now apply our ltering criteria by dropping all the
rms that had any of their loans overdue for 90 days or more. This is our
10. In Table C.2 we also report the sectoral coecients to provide some insight about the
NPL accumulation at an industry level. The major sectors like manufacturing, construction,
and services all show a signicant increase in NPLs, while some sectors like healthcare and
electricity show a decline.
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subset of performing" rms and our sample has about 55,000 thousand of
them, around 70% of the rms in our analysis. For these rms we can now
construct a weighted risk measure using the lending shares in Q4:09 and the
bank level risk measures from step 2 above. We can then use this as our
main explanatory variable to see if these performing" rms experienced
some real distress owing to the weakening of the balance sheets of their
creditors. B.2 presents the distribution of weighted non-performing loan
shares for the performing" rms.
The results are reported in Tables A.11 and A.12. The broad message
emerging from these tables is quite similar to the sovereign channel analysis.
Once again, we nd that heterogeneity matters and particularly along the
dimensions of leverage and the maturity structure of debt. Table A.11
reports the results when we interact the weighted risk measure with the high
leverage dummy. Economically, these results mean that for a highly leveraged
performing rm, as we move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of weighted
bank risk, we experience a contraction of 1.02% in terms of employment,
1.77% in terms of assets, 3.06% in terms of total debt, and 0.99% in terms of
intermediate commodity usage. The economic eects are greater for the high
short-term debt regressions, as reported in Table A.12. For a similar movement
from the bottom to the top decile of bank risk, the rm experiences a 1.7% fall
in terms of employment, 3.9% in terms of assets, 9.2% in terms of total debt,
and 2.4% in terms of materials used.
The broad conclusion that we derive is that regardless of the rm being
in good standing or not, leverage and debt maturity structure are important
determinants of a rm's access to credit and overall performance when the
overall macroeconomic scenario is adverse. What is more important is the
interaction of the shock with the borrower characteristics rather than the shock
per se.
4.2. Other Robustness Exercises
4.2.1. Do the results persist over time? The results presented above
correspond to the cross section of Q4:09 and Q4:10, i.e. in the immediate
aftermath of the shock. However, a natural question to ask is if these eects
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continue to prevail or if they become mitigated over time. To do this, we roll out
our window and estimate separate regressions in which the growth rates have
been taken between 2009-2011, 2009-2012, and so on. Figures B.6 - B.9 plot the
total eect on the high leverage and the high short-term debt rms. Figures B.6
and B.7 document the sovereign channel, while Figures B.8 and B.9 document
the spillover channel. The broad message in these gures is that the eects on
liabilities seem to have turned a corner but the eects on real variables tend to
be protracted, compounding up to 2013. One of the main reasons is the EU-
ECB-IMF nancial assistance program that Portugal entered in early 2011.
Central bank funding, bank capitalizations, and structural reforms all meant
that credit conditions eased and had positive eects on rms' performance. It
must be highlighted that we restrict our main quantitative results to the cross
section before Portugal entered the bailout program. A number of Euro level
measures taken by the ECB coupled with frequent domestic regulation changes,
post 2011, make identication especially dicult in this time period. It is for
this reason that we present these gures mainly for illustrative purposes.
4.2.2. What about exposure to the sovereign debt of GIIPS?. Thus far we have
considered the exposure of the banks only to the Portuguese sovereign and
arguably this was the most important source of risk for the Portuguese banks.
However, one can argue that a broader measure of ex ante vulnerability could
be constructed by allowing for the exposure to the sovereign debt of the GIIPS
countries.11 To this eect, we now construct a rm level sovereign exposure
variable, as before, allowing for the sovereign debt holdings for the GIIPS
countries. Tables A.9 and A.10 highlight the fact that our previous results are
robust to this alternative exposure measure. Similar checks were undertaken
with the banks' holding of Portuguese and Greek debt and Portuguese and
Spanish debt. In all these cases, our results and conclusions remain unaltered.
4.2.3. What about analyzing alternative time windows? The next robustness
check was done with respect to the selection of the time window. We compute
growth rates between Q4:09 and Q4:10 and this is our main window of analysis.
11. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
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However, we also conducted our analysis for Q4:08 and Q4:11 and also by
taking growth rates of the average values of Q4:08 and Q4:09 and Q4:10 and
Q4:11. Once again, our results and conclusions remain qualitatively unaltered.
The results are reported in Tables C.3 and C.4. One of the principle reasons
for not including 2011 in the baseline analysis is that 2011 was a very eventful
year in terms of many inuential events occurring simultaneously, e.g. Portugal
requested the Eurosystem bailout, the EBA conducted the stress tests and the
capital exercise, and so on.
4.2.4. Are the results being driven by a particularly vulnerable sector? We also
verify that our results are not driven by one particular sector. When one thinks
about which sectors could be relatively more adversely aected by the sovereign
debt crisis, construction seems to be the most natural candidate. Although we
have sector xed eects in of all our regressions, we re-estimated our regressions
excluding the rms in the construction sector and our results hold even in that
sub-sample.
4.2.5. Considering a broader measure of vulnerability. We also broadened our
measure of risk on the banks' balance sheets by constructing a vulnerability
index for the banks. This was simply the total amount of GIIPS bond holdings
and the total amount of lending to the construction sector, as a fraction of total
assets. Our results remain robust even to this broad vulnerability measure.
4.2.6. How do foreign banks inuence the analysis? One could also argue
that the Portuguese banking system consists of branches or subsidiaries of
foreign banks which could be "bailed out" by the mother bank should they
be in distress. It must be mentioned here that the Portuguese loan market is
dominated by Portuguese banks and that, as a result, the above concern is not
a valid one in our analysis. Despite that, to convince the reader we address this
concern by re-estimating our regression models excluding all foreign entities
operating in Portugal and our results remain consistent to this specication as
well. The results are reported in Table C.5 in the appendix.
4.2.7. Do banks that are more exposed to the sovereign have riskier clients?
Further analysis was conducted to ensure that our results are not driven by
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some particular way in which banks might be operating. For example, could it
be the case that banks that were lending to riskier borrowers were also holding
a high amount of safe" sovereign debt? This could be justied as a case of
diversication of the banks' portfolio. To verify that this was not the case, we
constructed bank level risk measures (share of non-performing loans in total
loans), from the credit registry, and computed the correlations with sovereign
holdings, ex ante. Figure B.5 in the appendix discourages the diversication
scenario. We report scatter plots and correlation coecients in the four quarters
prior to the sovereign shock. The correlations were found to be weak and non-
signicant. Despite this analysis, we augmented all of our regressions with sector
and location specic xed eects because such (hypothetical) matching might
take place if the rm and the bank were present in a particular sector or a
particular location.
4.2.8. Using an alternative estimation methodology. In terms of estimation
methodology, our robustness analysis included estimating weighted least square
models in which observations were weighted by some rm characteristics. We
used three dierent sets of weights, namely the number of employees as a
measure of rm size, the total assets as an additional proxy for size, and the
importance of the rm in the credit market.12 Our results and conclusions
remain completely robust to these weighted specications as well.
4.2.9. Placebo regressions. We also carry out some placebo exercises to
convince the reader that the eects documented are indeed a feature of
this particular stress period and are not confounded by other factors. In
the regressions documented thus far, we hold the bank's sovereign exposures
constant at their 2009:Q4 levels and report growth rates between 2009:Q4
and 2010:Q4. To be precise, we carry out two placebo exercises: (i) hold the
sovereign shares constant in 2007:Q4 and analyze growth rates between 2007:Q4
and 2008:Q4 and (ii) hold the sovereign shares constant at 2008:Q4 and analyze
growth rates between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q4. In other words, we recreate Tables
12. For the last case, the weight a rm received was its share of borrowing as a fraction of
total borrowing by all rms in the sample.
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A.5 and A.6 but calculating the growth rates between 2007 and 2008 (Figure
B.10 panel (a)) and between 2008-2009 (Figure B.10 panel (b)). We do not
nd any signicant eects for the highly leveraged rms or the rms that had
a greater share of short-term debt for any of the rm outcome variables under
consideration. This lends further credence to the fact that the results presented
are specic to the period under consideration.
5. A Model of Investment, Leverage and Debt Maturity
We present a simple model to interpret our empirical results. The analysis
provides conditions for leverage and debt maturity to determine the sensitivity
of rms' investment decisions to interest rate shocks. We analyze both the case
in which the observed variation in leverage and debt maturity is exogenous,
and the more plausible case in which the observed variation in leverage and
debt maturity captures an omitted variable that jointly determines investment
and debt maturity. In the second case, we interpret our empirical specication
as capturing the reduced form relationship between investment, the interest
rate shock, leverage, and debt maturity.
We nd that the presence of long-term investment projects and frictions
to the issuance of long-term debt, as captured by an individual specic term
premium, are needed for the model to account for the heterogeneous response
of investment to the nancial shock in our empirical analysis. Thus, through
the light of the theory, our empirical results highlight the importance of these
model elements to understand the real eects of nancial shocks.
5.1. Model Economy
We study the problem of an entrepreneur who lives for three periods, owns
a long-term project, and has access to an additional risky, linear investment
opportunity in the interim period. The new investment, and the negative
cash ows associated with the long-term investment, can be nanced with
short and long-term debt issuance. The entrepreneur faces a credit shock in
the interim period, i.e., the cost of credit in the interim period is uncertain.
Consumption takes place only in the last period. As in Brunnermeier and
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Sannikov (2014) and Arellano et al. (2017), the key friction in the model is
the inability of entrepreneurs to insure against idiosyncratic investment risk.
We allow entrepreneurs to insure, at least partially, against the nancial shock
by managing the maturity of their debt.
The entrepreneur starts the rst period, t= 0, with a long-term project with
deterministic cash ows {yt}2t=0. Cash ows might include negative elements
due to the initial investment or payments of previously issued debts. In the
rst period the entrepreneur chooses short (1-period) and long-term (2-period)
debt issuance d10 and d
2





0 = d0 = −y0.
We denote by r10 and r
2
0 the interest rate associated with the short and
long-term debt issued in the rst period, respectively. At the beginning of the
second period, t = 1, the (short-term) interest rate r11 ∈ [r, r̄] is realized. In
this interim period the entrepreneur has access to an investment opportunity k
with an uncertain return z ∈ [0,∞). She can issue new debt d11 to roll-over the
short-term debt issued in the rst period and/or nance the new investment,







In the nal period, t = 2, the last cash ow of the long-term project occurs,
the return of the interim investment is realized, short and long-term debts are
repaid, and consumption takes place,









Consolidating the budget constraints of the three periods, the problem of
the entrepreneur can be simplied to that of choosing the maturity of the debt
13. In referring to the total initial liabilities d0 as leverage, we are implicitly assuming
that the size of the initial long-term investment is common and equal to 1. It is relatively
straightforward to endogenize the initial long-term investment by assuming a linear
stochastic technology with returns in the intermediate and nal period. The analysis of
the investment decision in the intermediate period is unaected if we assume that the
uncertainty about the prole of returns of the long-term technology is realized at the
beginning of the intermediate period.
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in the initial period d20 and the investment in the interim period k to maximize
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In the analysis that follows we make two additional assumptions.
First, we restrict the long-term interest rate so that the net return of long-
term debt is strictly negative (positive) in the lowest (highest) interest rate
state:








(1 + r̄)− 1. (8)
As can be seen by inspecting the consolidated budget constraint (7), this
assumption guarantees that long-term debt is an eective asset to transfer
resources from low to high interest rate states.
In addition, we restrict the values for the initial leverage, the cash ow of
the long-term project, the interest rates in the rst period, and the value of
the long-term debt to guarantee that the net worth in the interim period is







− d0 > 0.
Assumption 2.b.
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(1 + r̄) (1 + r10)− (1 + r20)
< d20 <








(1 + r20)− (1 + r) (1 + r10)
.
Assumption 2.a requires that the initial net worth is positive. This
assumption guarantees that there exists a non-empty set of values for the long-
term debt d20 such that the net worth in the interim period is positive for all
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values of r11 ∈ [r, r̄]. That is, it guarantees that the interval in Assumption
2.b is non-empty. Given assumption 2.a, assumption 2.b will be satised when
we endogenize the maturity structure, but will be needed when analyzing the
investment decision conditional on a given value of the maturity structure.
We rst discuss the investment choice in the interim period, given leverage
d0 and the maturity structure in the rst period d
1
0 = d0 − d20 and d20, and then
consider the maturity choice in the initial period.
5.2. Investment decision
The investment conditional on leverage, debt maturity, and the interest rate















































The rst term in the last line is a decreasing function of the cost of credit in




/∂r1 < 0. It captures the pure eect of an interest
rate shock on the net return of investment. The second term is the value of the
net worth of the entrepreneur conditional on the realization of the interest
rate shock. These are the total resources available to invest. This term is
independent of the interest rate shock when there are no future cash ows
aecting the net worth, i.e., y2 − (1 + r20)d20 = 0.
In our empirical analysis we study the sensitivity of investment to a credit
shock, which we demonstrate to be associated with a rise in the cost of credit.
Furthermore, we show that leverage and the fraction of short-term debt amplify
the eect of the credit shock. We now show that, taking the debt maturity
decision as exogenous, this is a natural implication of the model, provided that
there are positive net future cash ows of the long term investment.
The elasticity of investment with respect to the interim interest rate is
decreasing in total leverage if and only if the cash ow in the last period net of














The net worth of the entrepreneur in the interim period is a function of the
interest rate shock only through its eect on the valuation of the nal period's
cash ows of the long-term investment project and the long-term debt. The
higher the leverage is, the larger is the weight of long-term cash ows in the net
worth in the interim period and, therefore, the more negative is the sensitivity
of investment to an interest rate shock.
Finally, it is easy to show that the elasticity of investment with respect to







The condition in Proposition 1 is stronger than that in Proposition 2.





, which as we show next, will be the relevant case when









condition in Proposition 1 is implied by assumptions 1 and 2.a. In this case, it
is easy to show that the impact of an increase in leverage on the elasticity of

















The above analysis takes as given the maturity structure of the debt in the
initial period. We now study the optimal maturity choice and, therefore, how
the maturity structure depends on the primitives of the model, e.g., the timing
of the cash ows of the long-term investment, {yt}2t=0, and the term premium,
1 + r2t . This analysis guides us to interpret the variation of the debt maturity
observed in the data and our empirical results. In particular, we characterize the
reduced form relationship between investment, the interest rate shock, leverage,
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and debt maturity, when these variables partially capture omitted variables that
jointly determine investment and debt maturity.
The rst-order condition characterizing the optimal debt maturity decision
(see Appendix for details) is:
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The numerator inside the expectation is the return of long-term debt. The
return of long-term debt is increasing in the intermediate period's interest rate.
The return is weighted by the marginal utility of consumption, which in the
log case is simply the reciprocal of the net worth in the intermediate period.
We rst consider the case in which the expectation hypothesis holds, i.e,









In this case, we obtain a simple expression for the optimal debt maturity





Long-term debt is chosen to nance all of the initial leverage that cannot be
paid back with the cash ows in the interim period. The variation in the amount
of long-term debt conditional on leverage is driven solely by the variation in
the cash ow in the interim period y1.
Solving for the short-term cash ow as a function of leverage and maturity,
y1 = (1 + r
1
0)(d0 − d20), and substituting into (9), we obtain a reduced form
relationship between investment, the interest rate shock, leverage, and debt
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Notice that, to simplify the analysis, we assume that there is no
heterogeneity in the second period's cash ow, y2, or the interest rates faced by
the entrepreneur in the initial period, r20. In the more general case, we would
need to integrate with respect to these additional dimensions of heterogeneity.
It follows that the (reduced-form) elasticity of investment with respect to









We next consider a situation with a positive term premium, the empirically
relevant case. Given Assumption (1), it is straightforward to show that
∂d20
∂ (1 + r20)
< 0.
When the term premium is positive entrepreneurs bear interest rate risk, i.e.,













the quantity of long-term debt is a decreasing function of the cash ow in the











The stronger eect is explained by the fact that the demand for interest rate
insurance is a decreasing function of the net worth when the utility function
14. In our empirical analysis we control for additional rm characteristics, e.g., .measures
of protability, age, size, and location and industry xed eects. In this analysis we assume
that these controls are only imperfect measures of the timing of the cash ows of the long-
term project or the time zero interest rates.
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exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, e.g., as is true in the case with log
preferences.15
This analysis suggests two important sources of variation of the maturity
of debt, conditional on leverage. The rst is given by the timing of the cash
ows of the long-term investment, e.g., variation on y1 or y2. The second is
given by variation across entrepreneurs in the term premium, r20, which can
be interpreted as a simple reduced form way to capture idiosyncratic frictions
to long-term borrowing. As the previous analysis shows, entrepreneurs whose
projects matures early or face a higher term premium choose to issue more
shorter-term debt.
We now analyze the reduced form relationship between investment, the
interest rate shock, leverage, and debt maturity, k̂(r11, d0, d
2
0). As before, to
simplify the analysis, we consider the case in which there are only two
dimensions of heterogeneity: leverage and the timing of the cash ows of the
long-term investment or the term premium, i.e., either y1, y2, or r
2
0. In this
case, the reduced form relationship between investment, the interest rate shock,





























 = 0, (11)
where the relationship between either y1, y2, or r
2
0, and d0 and d
2
0 is implicitly
dened by the second equation.
As the following two propositions show, these two sources of endogenous
variation in the maturity of debt are associated with very dierent implications
for the sensitivity of investment to interest rate shocks.
15. Due to this eect, we also have that the amount of long-term debt issued is a decreasing
function of the cash ow in the last period. Similarly, the eect of initial leverage on the

















We rst consider the case in which debt maturity, conditional on leverage,
varies due to the heterogeneity across entrepreneurs in the timing of the cash
ow of the long-term project, y1 and y2.









are heterogenous with respect to the initial leverage d0 and either y1 or y2. Let
k̂(r11, d0, d
2
0) be the reduced form relationship between investment, the interest










When the dierences in the maturity structure of debt are driven by
dierences in the maturity of the long-term project, i.e., y1 and y2, the
dierential debt maturity is not associated with a dierential sensitivity of
investment to the interest rate shock. In this case, the longer debt maturity
exactly compensates the fewer cash ows available in the interim period.
On the contrary, when the dierences in the maturity of debt are driven
by dierences in the term premium that the entrepreneur faces in the initial
period, i.e., 1 + r20, the dierential debt maturity is associated with a greater
sensitivity of investment to interest rate shock. This is established in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that entrepreneurs are heterogenous with respect







reduced form relationship between investment, the interest rate shock, leverage,
and debt maturity dened implicitly by equations (10) and (11). Then, at


















These results, together with our empirical analysis, suggest that it is
important to model frictions to the issuance of long-term debt to account for
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the eects of nancial crisis on rms' investment. In our simple model, frictions
to the issuance of long-term debt can be captured by an individual specic term
premium.
5.4. Discussion of Alternative Assumptions
In the Appendix we analyze an alternative model featuring diminishing
returns and collateral constraints, another set of common assumptions in the
macro-nance literature (Khan and Thomas 2013; Buera et al. 2015). In this
framework, the investment of constrained entrepreneurs does not respond to
an interest rate shock, provided that the collateral constraint is not aected
by the shock. In contrast, the investment of unconstrained entrepreneurs is a
decreasing function of the interest rate. We also show that the relationship
between initial leverage and the future constrained state of an entrepreneur
depends crucially on the heterogeneity driving initial leverage. In the case that
initial leverage is driven by heterogeneity in the initial net worth, entrepreneurs
with higher initial leverage are more likely to be constrained and, therefore, the
sensitivity of entrepreneurs' investment to the interest rate shock is a decreasing
function of leverage. The opposite result is obtained when the variation in
initial leverage is driven by heterogeneity in their initial productivity of
an entrepreneur. These results echo, in a more stylized framework, recent
numerical ndings by Ottonello and Winberry (2017).
5.5. Evidence from the data
The previous theory has strong implications regarding why some rms might
issue dierent amounts of long-term debt and fail to insure themselves
completely against any impending interest rate risk. The two reasons implied
by the model are higher cash ows or higher borrowing costs. We take the
theory back to the data by estimating a simple equation of the form,
(LT_debt_share)i,t = f (Xi,t) ,
where the left hand side represents the long-term debt as a fraction of total debt
for rm `i' at time `t'. Xi,t is a set of rm specic characteristics including the
variables rm specic borrowing costs, cash ows, rm size, investment, and
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external nance dependence.16 The goal here is not to make causal statements
but to explore which of the variables are most closely related with the long-
term debt issuance of a rm, focusing mainly on cash ows and rm specic
borrowing costs. We do not have information on rm specic interest rates
at dierent levels of maturity and, therefore, we construct a broad proxy for
rm borrowing costs. From the rm accounting database, we have information
on total interest paid by rms and therefore, we construct our measure as
total interest expenditure normalized by total debt. The cash ows are also
normalized by total debt. Investment is dened as the growth rate of xed
assets and rm size is the log of total assets.
Table A.13 presents the results. We use data from 2009-2014 except for
the last column. The over time specications are presented in columns 1 and 2
while column 3 reports results for the cross section 2009-2010. The results are in
alignment with the theory, as the interest rate and the cash ow show up with a
negative sign and are statistically signicant. However, we need to understand
how important are each of these variables economically. In terms of economic
magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in cost of borrowing (interest)
of the rm results in a decline in the long-term debt share by approximately 5 -
11 p.p., depending on the specication, while a one standard deviation increase
in cash ows leads to a reduction of long-term debt share by approximately 4
- 6 p.p. This suggests that the heterogeneity in the issuance of long-term debt
might have been driven, predominantly, by borrowing costs rather than cash
ows.
6. Conclusion
Using a novel loan level dataset from Portugal, we study how a nancial shock
may be transmitted to the real sector. We rst analyze credit supply eects
and then study rms' performance, in terms of employment, assets, liabilities,
and usage of intermediate commodities, in the aftermath of the sovereign debt
crisis. We identify two important dimensions of rm heterogeneity. Specically,
16. Calculated at a sectoral level following the methodology developed in Rajan and
Zingales (1998). It is dened as (capital_expenditure− cash_flows)/capital_expenditure.
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we show that ex ante highly leveraged rms and rms that had a shorter
maturity structure of debt experienced sharper contractions in credit and were
unable to tap into alternative sources of funding. The credit supply contraction
also had real eects. The same rms that experienced a reduction in credit also
contracted signicantly more than their counterparts.
In addition to performing the analysis by comparing the most leveraged
rms and the rms with the highest fraction of short-term debt (top quartile)
with their counterparts, we also study the eects along the entire distribution
of leverage and debt maturity. The overall amount of debt as a fraction of assets
(leverage) and the maturity structure, both seem to be important determinants
of rm performance when the overall macroeconomic scenario is adverse. We
also document that similar results hold for rms that themselves did not have
any loans in default but were indirectly aected because their lenders were in
distress. The broad conclusion that we derive is that regardless of the rm being
in good standing or not, leverage and debt maturity structure are important
determinants of a rm's access to credit and overall performance. What is
more important is the interaction of the shock with the borrower characteristics
rather than the shock per se.
Lastly, we also present a simple model of investment and debt maturity
under credit shocks to interpret our empirical results. The model highlights the
conditions under which leverage and debt maturity are key factors determining
the sensitivity of rms' investment to a credit shock. In addition, the model
provides a simple theory that sheds light on the determinants of the maturity
of a rm's debt vis-à-vis our empirical results. We show that when dierences
in the maturity structure of debt are driven by heterogeneity in the maturity
of investment projects (i.e. heterogeneity in cash ows from projects), a higher
quantity of short-term debt is not associated with a higher sensitivity of
investment to credit shocks. On the contrary, when dierences in the maturity
of debt are driven by heterogeneity in the term premium faced by the rm (i.e.
rm specic borrowing costs), a higher quantity of short-term debt is associated
with a higher sensitivity of investment to shocks.
The policy implications are straightforward. The debt-ratios (leverage) of
non-nancial corporations remain high by historical standards and it remains
an important source of vulnerability for the outlook of the corporate sector.
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Our results show that, besides the overall amount of debt, the strength of a
rm in terms of income (cash ow) generation and the maturity composition
of the debt are important determinants of rms' performance during a crisis
episode. It is also widely believed that a larger share of short-term debt increases
corporate vulnerabilities as it exposes rms to rollover risk more frequently.
Our analysis shows that it is important to understand the drivers of shorter
maturity structure of debt. When framing policies, heterogeneities along the
dimensions such as cash ow generation and rm specic borrowing costs must
be taken into consideration.
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Appendix A: Tables
CBSD CBSD & CRC >1 Relations
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Employment 13.66 120.34 21.56 149.42 25.33 162.57
Fixed Assets 934068.3 2.98e+07 1761126 4.06e+07 2094338 4.54e+07
Tot. Liab 2848650 8.58e+07 5572900 1.49e+08 6719576 1.67e+08
Int. Comm. Usage 203245.3 2.05e+06 325180.60 2.6e+06 390843.58 3.01e+06
EBIT 80525.3 2684130 137002 3605431 168671.72 4045453
Age 12.22 11.84 13.79 12.34 14.72 12.49
No. of rms 138639 106723 82561
High Leverage Low Leverage High ST Debt Low ST Debt
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Employment 29.73 245.50 23.58 114.17 23.26 200.58 27.07 121.64
Fixed Assets 4756188 8.29e+07 1055956 1.36e+07 890535.7 7903117 3109972 6.12e+07
Tot. Liab 1.77e+07 3.12e+08 2381914 1.80e+07 3041880 3.65e+07 9818381 2.24e+08
Int. Comm. 559478.1 4868151 324254.7 1786554 346758 3310647 429390.3 2701344
EBIT 305742.9 7122610 114449.7 1662172 102505.3 1908473 224422.1 5203882
Age 14.35 12.88 14.85 12.32 14.14 12.31 15.19 12.61
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics (Firms)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The tables above show the rm characteristics from dierent perspectives. The
rm characteristics reported are employment, xed assets, total liabilities, intermediate
commodity usage, earnings before interest and taxes, and age. All gures reported
correspond to Q4:09. CBSD is the rm balance sheet data, CRC is the central credit registry.
The left most panel on the top table shows the rms that le taxes, the central panel shows
all rms that le taxes and have lending relationships with one or more banks, while the
right most panel shows those rms that have relationships with multiple banks (our focus).
The bottom panel further zooms in on rms in the top right panel and helps us shed some
light on rm characteristics based on their leverage and maturity structure of debt. High
leverage corresponds to leverage above 47%, while high ST debt corresponds to short-term
debt above 53%.
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All Banks High Sov Share Low Sov Share P Value
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD (t-test)
Total Assets (bn) 14.1 28.3 18.3 35.2 11.5 21.4 0.44
Capital Ratio 14.85 7.74 15.17 8.80 14.59 6.98 0.83
Liquidity Ratio 13.44 15.96 16.54 17.08 10.87 14.97 0.31
Overdue/total loans 2.72 2.62 2.91 2.86 2.57 2.51 0.71
Corp. Share 28.84 18.73 27.90 15.01 30.41 21.65 0.59
Hhs. Share 25.59 23.55 19.84 14.55 30.39 28.56 0.20
Funding (securities/assets) 6.32 9.74 7.05 10.62 4.91 8.70 0.45
Funding (inter-bank/assets) 24.46 19.78 25.00 21.54 24.01 18.28 0.88
Funding (central bank/assets) 7.49 13.98 9.71 16.27 6.65 11.92 0.41
Loan to deposit 2.22 2.24 1.88 1.59 2.50 2.68 0.43
No. of banking groups 33 15 18
Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics (Banks)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Figures are for Q4:09. Consolidated for 33 main nancial institutions. High-sov bank
is one that had sovereign share>6%. Overdue/total loans is a measure of risk on the
banks' balance sheet. We next report the share of bank lending going to the corporate and
the household sectors. Funding from securities is a measure of market dependence of the
bank. We also report funding obtained from the interbank market and the central bank, as
fractions of total assets. The 15 high-sov banking groups comprise Portuguese and Spanish
banks only. The 18 low-sov banking groups also contain mostly Portuguese banks. Other
banks in this group have their origins in Spain, Germany, France, Brazil, and Angola. The
last column reports the p-values from a simple two sided t-test for the equality of means
between the high-sov and the low-sov banking groups. We fail to reject the null hypothesis:
H0 : µhighsov − µlowsov = 0.
High Sov Share Low Sov Share
Variables Mean SD Mean SD P Value
Age 19.24 4.73 18.79 5.01 0.79
Firmsize 15.32 0.78 15.68 0.91 0.24
ST debt share 0.27 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.21
Leverage 0.62 0.24 0.79 0.32 0.13
Protability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.75
NPL ratio 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.57
No. of banking groups 15 18
Table A.3. Banks' Weighted Borrower Characteristics
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Figures are for Q4:09. Consolidated for 33 main nancial institutions. High-sov bank
is one that had sovereign share>6%. The gures above correspond to weighted average
borrower characteristics of each bank. The weights are calculated using outstanding loans
as of Q4:09. Firmsize is the log of total assets, ST debt share is short-term debt normalized
by total debt, leverage is dened as all interest bearing liabilities normalized by total assets,
protability is earnings before interest and taxes normalized by total assets, and NPL ratio
is the non-performing loans as a fraction of total loans. The last column reports the p-values
from a simple two sided t-test for the equality of means between the high-sov and the low-sov
banking groups. We fail to reject the null hypothesis: H0 : µhighsov − µlowsov = 0.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Leverage Leverage ST Debt ST Debt Lev (All) ST Debt (All )
Sov_exp. 0.094 0.135 0.353 0.206 0.442 0.280 0.391
0.409 (0.409) (0.473) (0.393) (0.470) (0.393) (0.411)
Highlev*sov_exp -0.412*** -0.360** -0.279**
(0.146) (0.155) (0.140)
ST debt*sov_exp -0.537*** -0.556*** -0.560**
(0.163) (0.187) (0.223)
Cap_ratio 0.192 0.202 0.054 0.071
(0.438) (0.438) (0.464) (0.475)
Liq_ratio 1.108 1.089 0.973 0.946
(1.124) (1.133) (1.116) (1.163)
Bank_size 0.042** 0.043** 0.033** 0.035**







Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y N N
Observations 144,966 144,966 144,966 139,821 139,821 198,708 184,416
Table A.4. Lending Eects
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The dependent variable is the loan growth rate at the bank-rm level. Columns
1 - 5 represent regression results for rms having multiple banking relationships ex ante.
Column 1 presents the baseline regression with no interaction terms. Columns 2 - 5 introduce
interactions with the high leverage dummy and the high ST debt dummy. Columns 6 & 7
include rms having single relationships as well. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding -0.002 -0.427 -0.034 -0.048
(0.091) (0.268) (0.245) (0.093)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 88,204 89,410 89,466 89,823
Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table A.5. Average Eects
Source: Authors' calculations
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding (α1) 0.030 -0.279 0.233 0.024
(0.083) (0.248) (0.206) (0.078)
Wtd_sov_holding*Highlev (α2) -0.199* -0.834*** -1.605*** -0.450***
(0.112) (0.207) (0.410) (0.142)
Highlev 0.023*** -0.009 0.001 0.050
(0.008) (0.161) (0.027) (0.085)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
P(α1 + α2 < 0) 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 88,204 89,410 89,466 89,823
Table A.6. Interaction with leverage
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The dependent variables are the growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities,
and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively. The main independent variable is the
weighted Portuguese sovereign bond holdings of rms in September 2009. Firm level controls
include age, size, value added, and sector and location xed eects. Weighted bank controls
include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average interest rates charged by the respective
banks. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses. We also report
the p-values from a one sided t-test with H0: α1 + α2 < 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding (α1) 0.017 -0.392 0.097 -0.019
(0.090) (0.256) (0.349) (0.092)
Wtd_sov_holding* High_stdebt (α2) -0.140** -0.265** -0.289** -0.218***
(0.069) (0.110) (0.125) (0.046)
High_stdebt -0.023 -0.144 0.097*** 0.000
(0.017) (0.160) (0.036) (0.044)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
P(α1 + α2 < 0) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
Observations 88,204 89,410 89,828 89,823
Table A.7. Interaction with short-term debt
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The dependent variables are the growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities,
and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively. The main independent variable is the
weighted Portuguese sovereign bond holdings of rms in September 2009. Firm level controls
include age, size, value added, and sector and location xed eects. Weighted bank controls
include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average interest rates charged by the respective
banks. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses. We also report
the p-values from a one sided t-test with H0: α1 + α2 < 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding 0.047 -0.250 0.876 0.050
(0.084) (0.238) (0.355) (0.078)
Wtd_sov_holding * Highlev -0.194* -0.825*** -2.408*** -0.443***
(0.111) (0.206) (0.519) (0.142)
Wtd_sov_holding* High_stdebt -0.131* -0.229** -0.163 -0.199***
(0.067) (0.107) (0.110) (0.045)
Highlev 0.024*** -0.008 -0.03 0.051
(0.008) (0.161) (0.028) (0.085)
High_stdebt -0.025 -0.290 0.13 0.015
(0.019) (0.216) (0.116) (0.034)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 88,204 89,410 89,828 89,823
Table A.8. Leverage and Short-term debt
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The dependent variables are the growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities,
and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively. The main independent variable is the
weighted Portuguese sovereign bond holdings of rms in September 2009. Firm level controls
include age, size, value added, and sector and location xed eects. Weighted bank controls
include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average interest rates charged by the respective
banks. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_GIIPS (α1) 0.010 -0.159 0.292 0.031
(0.065) (0.214) (0.121) (0.060)
Wtd_GIIPS*Highlev (α2) -0.179* -0.758*** -1.447*** -0.410***
(0.105) (0.172) (0.338) (0.122)
Highlev 0.023*** -0.010 0.000 0.050
(0.008) (0.162) (0.027) (0.085)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
P(α1 + α2 < 0) 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 88,204 89,410 89,466 89,823
Table A.9. Interaction with leverage (GIIPS exposure)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The dependent variables are the growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities,
and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively. The main independent variable is the
weighted GIIPS sovereign bond holdings of rms in September 2009. Firm level controls
include age, size, value added, and sector and location xed eects. Weighted bank controls
include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average interest rates charged by the respective
banks. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses. We also report
the p-values from a one sided t-test with H0: α1 + α2 < 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_GIIPS (α1) 0.002 -0.244 0.155 -0.001
(0.072) (0.220) (0.290) (0.072)
Wtd_GIIPS * High_stdebt (α2) -0.129** -0.242* -0.269** -0.204***
(0.052) (0.122) (0.100) (0.037)
High_stdebt -0.023 -0.145 0.098*** 0.000
(0.017) (0.160) (0.036) (0.044)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
P(α1 + α2 < 0) 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99
Observations 88,204 89,410 89,828 89,823
Table A.10. Interaction with ST Debt (GIIPS exposure)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The dependent variables are the growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities,
and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively. The main independent variable is the
weighted GIIPS sovereign bond holdings of rms in September 2009. Firm level controls
include age, size, value added, and sector and location xed eects. Weighted bank controls
include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average interest rates charged by the respective
banks. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses. We also report
the p-values from a one sided t-test with H0: α1 + α2 < 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_N̂PL (α1) -0.113 0.107 -0.425** -0.133**
(0.088) (0.173) (0.097) (0.054)
Wtd_N̂PL * Highlev (α2) -0.150*** -0.261*** -0.451*** -0.146***
(0.030) (0.051) (0.027) (0.033)
Highlev 0.002 -0.156*** 0.24 -0.058***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
P(α1 + α2 < 0) 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99
Observations 53,780 53,528 54,425 54,444
Table A.11. Spillover eects (Interaction with leverage)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The rms included in this regression are the ones that did not have any loan overdue
for 90 days or more in Q4:09 or Q4:10. The dependent variables are the growth rates of
employment, xed assets, liabilities, and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively.
The main independent variable is the weighted GIIPS sovereign bond holdings of rms
in September 2009. Firm level controls include age, size, value added, and sector and
location xed eects. Weighted bank controls include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and
average interest rates charged by the respective banks. Clustered standard errors (bank
level) are reported in parentheses. We also report the p-values from a one sided t-test with
H0: α1 + α2 < 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_N̂PL (α1) -0.076 0.203 -0.075 -0.067
(0.089) (0.180) (0.119) (0.053)
Wtd_N̂PL* High_stdebt (α2) -0.251*** -0.582*** -1.597*** -0.358***
(0.031) (0.087) (0.127) (0.040)
High_stdebt -0.061 1.209* -1.25 -0.063
(0.287) (0.615) (0.687) (0.366)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FE Y Y Y Y
P(α1 + α2 < 0) 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
Observations 53,780 53,528 54,445 54,444
Table A.12. Spillover eects (Interaction with ST debt)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: The rms included in this regression are the ones who did not have any loan overdue
for 90 days or more in 2009: Q4 or 2010:Q4. The dependent variables are the growth rates
of employment, xed assets, liabilities and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively.
The main independent variable is the weighted GIIPS sovereign bond holdings of rms in
September 2009. Firm level controls include age, size, value added, and sector and location
xed eects. Weighted bank controls include capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average
interest rates charged by the respective banks. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are
reported in the parentheses. We also report the p-values from a one sided t-test with H0:
α1 + α2 < 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Time FE Macro controls Cross section
Interest rate -0.236*** -0.302*** -0.141***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Cash ow -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Investment 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)




Firm FE Y Y N
Time FE Y N N
Macro Controls N Y N
Observations 514,663 514,663 70,016
R-squared 0.592 0.588 0.047




















Note: The 90th percentile corresponds to a weighted sovereign holding of 9.3% while the 10th percentile corresponds to 0.7%
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Note: The 90th percentile corresponds to a npl share of 8.9% while the 10th percentile corresponds to 3.2%.
Figure B.2: Firms' weighted predicted NPL shares
Source: Authors' calculations



































































Effects by Quartiles of ST Debt
(b) ST Debt
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Note: The respective correlations are -0.064, -0.067, -0.033 & -0.041 and none of them are statistically significant.
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Figure B.6: Sovereign Channel: Eects over time (Leverage)
Source: Authors' calculations
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Figure B.9: Spillover channel: Eects over time (ST debt)
Source: Authors' calculations




Note: Changes between 2007-2008
(a) Leverage




Note: Changes between 2008-2009
(b) ST Debt
Figure B.10: Placebo regressions
Source: Authors' calculations
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Appendix C: Additional Figures and Tables
C.1. Persistence of relationships
The table below shows the persistence of bank-rm relationships in Portugal.
In the rst two columns we report the probability of a bank being a rm's lead
bank in period ‘t′ conditional on it being the lead bank in period ‘t − 1′. In
columns 3 and 4 we report the probability of a particular rm borrowing from a
particular bank in period ‘t′ conditional on it having borrowed in period ‘t− 1′.
As we can observe, both the probabilities are in excess of 0.8 demonstrating
that the relationships tend to be extremely persistent.
Yt = leadt Yt = leadt Yt = anyt Yt = anyt
Yt−1 = leadt−1 0.802***
[0.000]
Yt−1 = anyt−1 0.867***
[0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2006.year 0.827*** 0.876***
[0.000] [0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2007.year 0.810*** 0.856***
[0.000] [0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2008.year 0.818*** 0.859***
[0.000] [0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2009.year 0.760*** 0.864***
[0.000] [0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2010.year 0.795*** 0.876***
[0.000] [0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2011.year 0.792*** 0.864***
[0.000] [0.000]
Yt−1 ∗ 2012.year 0.810*** 0.870***
[0.000] [0.000]
Time Eects Y Y Y Y
Number of obs. 84790059 84790059 84790059 84790059
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table C.1. Relationship Regression
Source: Authors' calculations
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(Signicantly Positive) (Signicantly Negative) (Signicantly Positive) (Signicantly Negative)
Transportation 0.025*** Engineering -0.08*** Transportation 0.017*** Extraction -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Construction 0.038*** Tobacco -0.027*** Construction 0.021*** Tobacco -0.001*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Telecommunications 0.034*** Coal extraction -0.027*** Cork 0.025*** Electricity/Gas -0.015***
(0.012) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Cork 0.033*** Defense -0.026*** Printing 0.013*** Sewerage -0.014***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Leather 0.029*** Water -0.026*** Manufacture (food) 0.019*** Legal -0.008***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.002)
Civil Eng. 0.026*** Veterinary -0.022*** Manu. (non-metal) 0.007*** Veterinary -0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0,003) (0.004)
Real Estate 0.020*** Extraction -0.019*** Manufacture (metal) 0.012*** Healthcare -0.006**
(0.003) (0.007) ((0.003)) (0.002)
Advertising 0.019*** Electricity/Gas -0.017*** Manu. (electrical) 0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Rental 0.019*** Healthcare -0.013*** Manu. (transport) 0.038***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.015)
Manu. (furniture) 0.017*** Research -0.013* Manu. (furniture) 0.022***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Printing 0.016*** Manu. (pharma) -0.012* Civil Eng. 0.013***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Lodging 0.016*** Legal -0.010*** Construction 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Textiles 0.015*** Real Estate 0.009***
(0.004) (0.003)
Repair 0.015*** Advertising 0.008**
(0.002) (0.004)














Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.2. NPL Predictor
Source: Authors' calculations.
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C.3. Using alternative time windows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding 0.285 -0.572 -0.423 0.504**
(0.173) (0.682) (0.613) (0.230)
Wtd_sov_holding*Highlev -1.447*** -1.890*** -0.895*** -1.787***
(0.270) (0.379) (0.330) (0.381)
Highlev -0.144*** -0.048* 0.055*** 0.030
(0.031) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020)
Constant 0.138*** -1.473*** 0.325*** 0.078***
(0.023) (0.067) (0.041) (0.023)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 68,582 68,702 68,942 69,205
R-squared 0.061 0.191 0.034 0.096
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding 0.033 -0.795 -0.054 0.204
(0.211) (0.705) (1.368) (0.312)
Wtd_sov_holding*High_stdebt -0.446*** -1.023*** -1.540** -0.520***
(0.152) (0.371) (0.247) (0.156)
High_stdebt -0.054** -0.247** 0.055* -0.028
(0.023) (0.106) (0.028) (0.026)
Constant 0.133*** -1.492*** 0.563*** 0.071***
(0.025) (0.072) (0.122) (0.023)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 63,878 63,963 64,428 64,428
R-squared 0.049 0.137 0.023 0.078
Table C.3. Interactions with leverage and short-term debt (Q4:08 - Q4:11)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: This table is comparable to Tables A.6 and A.7 earlier. The main dierences are that
the weighted sovereign bond holdings of rms are kept constant at Q4:2008 and the growth
rates are computed between 2008 and 2011. The dependent variables are the growth rates
of employment, xed assets, liabilities, and usage of intermediate commodities, respectively.
The rm level controls used were age, size, value added, and xed eects for the sector and
location of operation. The weighted bank controls used were the capital ratio, liquidity ratio,
and average loan interest rates charged. Clustered standard errors (bank level) are reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding 0.087 -0.492 0.147 0.372*
(0.128) (0.470) (0.467) (0.189)
Wtd_sov_holding*Highlev -0.912*** -1.412*** -1.679*** -1.217***
(0.197) (0.252) (0.394) (0.252)
Highlev -0.034* 0.274*** 0.043*** 0.068***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 0.107*** -0.805*** 0.244*** 0.048**
(0.019) (0.048) (0.031) (0.021)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 68,582 68,702 68,942 69,205
R-squared 0.048 0.139 0.036 0.080
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding -0.067 -0.689 -0.277 0.162
(0.157) (0.496) (0.474) (0.235)
Wtd_sov_holding*High_stdebt -0.279** -0.516* -0.195* -0.298***
(0.113) (0.279) (0.174) (0.082)
High_stdebt -0.044** -0.162** 0.078*** -0.004
(0.018) (0.075) (0.017) (0.021)
Constant 0.103*** -0.815*** 0.220*** 0.041*
(0.019) (0.051) (0.048) (0.020)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 63,878 63,963 64,428 64,428
R-squared 0.049 0.137 0.023 0.078
Table C.4. Interactions with leverage and short-term debt (Avg (08 - 09) vs. Avg
(10 - 11)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: This table is comparable to Tables A.6 and A.7 earlier. The main dierences are that
the weighted sovereign bond holdings of rms are kept constant at Q4:2008 and the growth
rates are computed between the average values for 2008 and 2009 and 2010 and 2011. The
dependent variables are the growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities, and usage
of intermediate commodities, respectively. The rm level controls used were age, size, value
added, and xed eects for the sector and location of operation. The weighted bank controls
used were the capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and average loan interest rates charged. Clustered
standard errors (bank level) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C.4. Excluding foreign banks from the analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding 0.001 -0.251 0.390** 0.030
(0.062) (0.232) (0.157) (0.076)
Wtd_sov_holding*Highlev -0.150** -0.696*** -1.443*** -0.346***
(0.074) (0.166) (0.405) (0.101)
Highlev 0.017 0.033 0.010 0.048
(0.061) (0.139) (0.031) (0.091)
Constant 0.172*** -0.457*** 0.106*** 0.095***
(0.016) (0.047) (0.024) (0.015)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 65,746 66,608 66,619 66,893
R-squared 0.034 0.087 0.037 0.056
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Gr_emp Gr_ast Gr_liab Gr_int
Wtd_sov_holding -0.010 -0.340 0.420 0.001
(0.062) (0.238) (0.433) (0.084)
Wtd_sov_holding*High_stdebt -0.091 -0.166** -0.218* -0.190***
(0.080) (0.077) (0.126) (0.047)
High_stdebt -0.272 -5.239*** -1.173 -1.129**
(0.518) (1.308) (0.776) (0.540)
Constant 0.170*** -0.470*** 0.081 0.092***
(0.016) (0.048) (0.051) (0.016)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y
Wtd. Bank Controls Y Y Y Y
Sector & Location FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 65,746 66,608 66,896 66,893
R-squared 0.034 0.087 0.020 0.056
Table C.5. Interactions with leverage and short-term debt (Portuguese banks only)
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: This table is comparable to Tables A.6 and A.7 earlier. The only dierence is that all
the foreign banks have been excluded from the analysis. The dependent variables are the
growth rates of employment, xed assets, liabilities, and usage of intermediate commodities,
respectively. The rm level controls used were age, size, value added, and xed eects for the
sector and location of operation. The weighted bank controls used were the capital ratio,
liquidity ratio, and average loan interest rates charged. Clustered standard errors (bank
level) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C.5. Exploring other dimensions of heterogeneity
We have analyzed rm heterogeneity along two main dimensions: leverage and
maturity structure of debt. However, we also analyzed dierences in terms
of age, size, degree of external nancing, and protability.17 We estimate
equations similar to the ones in equations (4) and (5), i.e.,





1 + εj ,
where high“x” is a dummy and is equal to 1 for the top quartile of the respective
variable, at the pre-crisis level and xε(size, age, externalfinance, profitability).
high_size= 1 if the rm has assets of more than 1 million euros, high_age= 1
if the rm is more than 18 years old, high_extfin = 1 if the rm nances
more than 35% of its capital expenditure through external nancing, and
high_profit = 1 if the rm's prots as a ratio of total assets is greater than
36%. Figure 9 plots α1 + α2 along with the 95% condence intervals. As can
be seen, we do not nd statistically signicant eects for any of the variables
considered.
17. External nance = (capex-cash ows)/capex
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Figure C.1: Figure 12: Exploring other dimensions of heterogeneity
Source: Authors' calculations.
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C.6. Average eects over time
As mentioned before, we do not nd signicant negative eects of the sovereign
debt crisis, on average. In Figure 13 we re-estimate equation (3) to analyze
if there were any signicant average eects over time. We plot the point
estimates of the weighted average sovereign debt exposures along with the 95%
condence intervals. The dependent variable changes as we analyze growth
rates between 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14. The sovereign
exposure measure is held constant at the pre-crisis (2009) level. We control for
appropriate bank, rm, geographic, and sectoral characteristics. Overall, we do
not observe any signicant eects on average.
-1 0 1 -1 0 1
Employment Assets
Liabilities Int. Comm.
09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14
Figure C.2: Average eects over time (Sovereign Channel)
Source: Authors' calculations.
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We perform a similar analysis for the spillover channel to investigate the
eects on average. The results are shown in Figure 14. The equation estimated
is almost identical to equation (3) except that instead of the banks' sovereign
exposures, the main independent variable is the estimated risk on the banks'
balance sheet as explained in Section 4. Once again, we do not observe any
signicant pattern over time.
-1 0 1 -1 0 1
Employment Assets
Liabilities Int. Comm.
09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14
Figure C.3: Average eects over time (Spillover Channel)
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Appendix D: Theoretical Appendix
In this appendix we characterize the model presented in Section 5 and provide
the proofs of the propositions stated in that section.
Given the total leverage d0 and the quantity of long-term debt d
2
0, the







z − 1− r11
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The rst-order condition is:
Ez
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and ω(r11) is the value of the net worth of the entrepreneur at the beginning of
the intermediate period.





















The proof of propositions 1 and 2 follow from dierentiating this expression
with respect to leverage and the maturity of the debt in the rst period.


















The inequality follows from the condition y2 − (1 + r20)d20 > 0.


























































where the inequality follows from Assumption 2.a. 
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D.1. Maturity decision
Using the optimal investment decision, consumption in the last period can be
written as
c2 =











+ y2 − (1 + r20)d20 + (1 + r11)(y1 − (1 + r10)(d0 − d20))
=
[

























































y2 + (1 + r11) (y1 − (1 + r10)d0) + ((1 + r11) (1 + r10)− (1 + r20))d20
= 0.
(D.2)










































y1 − (1 + r20)d0
= 0.
Assumption (2.a) implies that the amount of long-term debt is a decreasing
function of the term premium in the neighborhood of the case without a term
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, and the inequality follows from Assumption (2.a). Next,
we consider the comparative statics of long-term debt when there is a strictly









As before, the amount of long-term debt is a decreasing function of the cash













































































The rst term equals the eects of y1 on d
2
0 when the entrepreneur is not
exposed to interest rate risk. As the cash ow in the iterim period increases,
more of the initial leverage can be repaid in one period and, therefore, less
long-term debt needs to be issuaced. The sign of the second terms follows




the net worth in















decreasing function of r11. The second term captures the eect of changes in
the net worth on the demand for insurance. In general, the sign of this term
depends on the coecient of risk aversion. In our log case, the coecient of
absolute risk aversion is a strictly decreasing function of net worth. Therefore,
the second term is negative.
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All in all, when the term premium is positive, the result is a greater











Related, the amount of long-term debt is a decreasesing function of the cash






















As was the case when considering the eect of the cash ow in the interim
period, as the coecient of risk aversion is decreasing, the demand for insurance
is a decreasing function of the cash ow in the last period.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we consider the case in which entrepreneurs
are heterogeneous with respect to the initial leverage and the income in the
interim period y1. Equation (11) denes implicitly a function relating y1 and
d0 and d
2
0, which, abusing notation, we denote y1(d0, d
2
0). Using this notation,










where we have omitted the dependence of k on parameters that are assumed




0. Applying the Chain Rule


















































































where the last equality uses the rst-order condition for the optimal maturity




















































We next consider the case in which entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with
respect to the initial leverage and the income in the nal period y2. Equation
(11) denes implicitly a function relating y2 and d0 and d
2
0, which, abusing
notation, we denote y2(d0, d
2











where we have omitted the dependence of k on parameters that are assumed




0. Applying the Chain Rule
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[y2 + (1 + r11) (y1 − (1 + r10)d0) + ((1 + r11) (1 + r10)− (1 + r20))d20]
]
=0.
where, as before, the last equality uses the rst-order condition for the optimal



































































































































Proof of Proposition 4:When entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect
to the initial leverage and the term premium r20, equation (11) denes implicitly
a function relating r20 and d0 and d
2
0, which, abusing notation, we denote
r20(d0, d
2












where we have omitted the dependence of k on parameters that are assumed
to be common across entrepreneurs, i.e., y1, y2, r
1
0. Applying the Chain Rule
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where the second equality uses the fact that d20 = d0 − y1/(1 + r10) when








, and the inequality follows from Assumption (2.a).





























































































































where the second equality uses the fact that d20 = d0 − y1/(1 + r10) when








, and the inequality follows from the condition
y2 − (1 + r20)d20. 
D.2. Alternative Model Assumptions: Collateral Constraints and
Diminishing Returns
In this appendix we extend the analysis of the reduced form relationship
between investment, interest rate shocks, and leverage, to an environment with
collateral constraints and diminishing returns. These are alternative common
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assumptions in the recent macroeconomic models used to study the aggregate
eects of nancial crisis.18
As in the benchmark model, we consider the investment problem of
an entrepreneur that lives for three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, facing investment
opportunities in the rst two periods and consuming in the last one.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to the initial net worth a0 and
the productivity of their investment opportunities zt, t = 0, 1. To simplify the
exposition, we assume that the productivities are known to individuals at the
beginning of period 0, and are distributed across agents according to
(z0, z1) ∼ G0 (z0)G1 (z1) .
That is, productivities are assumed to be independent over time.




t , t = 0, 1.
We abstract from uninsurable investment risk and, instead, we assume that
investment is constrained by individual's net worth
kt ≤ λat,
where λ parameterizes the collateral constraint and at denotes the net worth
at time t = 0, 1.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and
do not discount the future. Therefore, there is no role for the maturity of debt.
We therefore restrict the analysis to one period debt. Given this, we denote by
rt the one period interest rate.





1 + (1− δ)k1 − (1 + r1) (k1 − a1)
18. Collateral constraint is a popular device to introduce nancial frictions into macro
models, e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), while
diminishing returns have been featured in quantitative oriented analyses of nancial shocks,
e.g., Khan and Thomas (2013), Buera et al. (2015), among others.




0 + (1− δ)k0 − (1 + r0) (k0 − a0)
kt ≤ λat, t = 0, 1.
The capital input at time t = 0
k0 =
































0 + (1 + r0)a0 otherwise .
(D.8)
The initial leverage is
l0 =


























If the capital input is constrained, then leverage is highest (and independent of
initial net worth and productivity). Otherwise, leverage is a strictly decreasing
function of the initial net worth and a strictly increasing function of the initial
productivity.
The capital input at t = 1
k1 =













Using (D.8) and (D.10), we can write the average investment in the interim
period of individuals with initial net worth a0 and initial productivty z0 as a
function of the interest rate in period t = 1








dG1 (z) + (1−G1 (ẑ1))λa1 (a0, z0)
where z∗ is the productivity of the marginal entrepreneur who is unconstrained
in the intermediate period







and the function a1 (a0, z0) is dened in (D.8) (we omit the initial interest rate
r0 as an input of the interim investment and net worth functions).
The sentitivity of average investment to the interest rate in the interim
period










1−α dG1 (z) .
A change in the interest rate aects only the entrepreneurs whose investment is
unconstrained, that is, entrepreneurs with relatively low productivity at time
t = 1, i.e., z1 ≤ z∗1 .
As in the analysis in the main text, we are interested in characterizing
the reduced form relationship between investment, the interest rate (nancial)
shock, and initial leverage, which are the key variables in our empirical analysis.
To obtain a simple characterization of this reduced form relationship, we
assume that the initial heterogeneity is one-dimensional. We consider two
polar cases: (i) z0 is common and, therefore, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous
only in terms of their initial networth a0 ; (ii) a0 is common and, therefore,
entrepreneurs are only heterogeneous in terms of their inital productivity z0.
In these cases, the reduced form relationship between investment, the interest
rate shock, and initial leverage is
k̂ (r1, l0) = k (r1, a0 (l0) , z0)
or
k̂ (r1, l0) = k (r1, a0, z0 (l0)) ,
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depending on whether the heterogeneity stems from the initial net worth or
the initial productivity, respectively. The relationships between the initial net
worth or the initial productivity and leverage, a0 (l0) or z0 (l0), are derived
from (D.9). To guarantee that leverage is interior, l0 ∈ (0, 1− 1/λ), we focus
on cases in which entrepreneurs are unconstrained in the rst period.
Heterogeneous a0, Common z0
When the heterogeneity is solely in terms of the initial net worth a0, the
reduced form relationship between investment, the interest rate shock, and
initial leverage is










+ (1−G1 (ẑ1))λa1 (a0 (l0) , z0) ,
where the relationship between the initial net worth and leverage







is obtained by rearranging (D.9) and the marginal unconstrained entrepreneur
in the interim period








(r0 + δ) + (1 + r0) (1− l0)
]1−α
.
The last equation follows from (D.8), (D.11), and (D.12).
In this case, individuals with higher initial leverage are those with lower
initial net worth. Therefore, highly leveraged individuals are those who are
more likely to be constrained in the interim period. In particular, the fraction
of unconstrained individuals in period t = 1 equals G (z∗1 (a0 (l0) , z0)) and is a
decreasing function of leverage l0 as
dz∗1
dl0












The reduced form impact of initial leverage on the average sensitivity of

















A change in the interest rate aects only the entrepreneurs whose
investment is unconstrained, that is, entrepreneurs with relatively low
productivity at time t = 1, i.e., z1 ≤ z∗1 . In the case in which leverage is
driven by diereneces in the initial net worth, entrepreneurs who initially have
higher leverage are more likely to be constrained and, therefore, they are less
responsive to a change in the interest rate.
Heterogeneous z0, Common a0
We now consider the other extreme case, in which entrepreneurs have a common
initial net worth and, therefore, the heterogeneity is only in terms of the initial
productivity z0. The reduced form relationship between investment, the interest
rate shock, and initial leverage is










+ (1−G1 (ẑ1))λa1 (a0, z0 (l0)) ,









is obtained by rearranging (D.9) and the marginal unconstrained entrepreneur
in the interim period










+ 1 + r0
]1−α
.
The last equation follows from (D.8), (D.11), and (D.13).
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In this case, individuals with higher initial leverage are those with a higher
initial productivity and, therefore, higher net worth at the beginning of the
interim period. Thus, highly leveraged individuals are those who are less
likely to be constrained in the interim period. The fraction of unconstrained
individuals in period t = 1 equals G (z∗1 (a0 (l0) , z0)) and is an increasing

















+ 1 + r0
]−α
> 0.
The reduced form impact of initial leverage on the average sensitivity of
















As before, a change in the interest rate aects only the entrepreneurs
whose investment is unconstrained, that is, entrepreneurs with relatively low
productivity at time t = 1, i.e., z1 ≤ z∗1 . In the case in which leverage is driven
by dierences in the initial productivity, entrepreneurs who are initially more
leveraged are less likely to be constrained in the interim period and, therefore,
they are more responsive to a change in the interest rate.
